Radiology Site-Neutral Payments

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Radiology reading room adjacent to an MRI suite
Executive research report

The Radiology Site-Neutral Shock

Medicare’s proposed 2027 payment realignment and the strategic future of radiology. A critical integrative evidence synthesis with transparent scenario analysis.

  • Radiology payment
  • Operations
  • Access
  • Market structure
Proposal statusAs of July 31, 2026 the CY 2027 OPPS imaging provision remains a proposed CMS rule. It is not final policy. All modeled results are conditional on finalization, implementation, and the resulting payment files.
01 Executive synthesis

The decisive variable is not whether a service is called site neutral

Which service, department, payment component, and patient pathway are actually changed?

Four headline metrics: 2.5x average OPPS-to-PFS differential, $260M CMS CY 2027 total reduction, +67% utilization per beneficiary 2016 to 2025, and 31 to 54 percent PFS share of OPPS by APC
Headline figures
Four numbers that frame the decision

Source: CMS CY 2027 OPPS proposed rule. Author-developed summary graphic.

$260MCY 2027 reduction

$190M Medicare program savings plus $70M in beneficiary coinsurance savings, first year.

+67%Use per beneficiary

Change in the CMS top-70 noncontrast cohort, 2016 through 2025, while FFS enrollment fell 17%.

31-54%PFS share of OPPS

CMS estimate of the PFS proxy as a share of OPPS at the affected APC level.

The six leadership conclusions

1

The direct shock lands on excepted off-campus provider-based departments

CMS proposes a PFS-equivalent payment for imaging without contrast assigned to APCs 5521 through 5524 and composite APCs 8004, 8005, and 8007, when billed with modifier PO. The proposal does not directly reduce payment for the same services at on-campus HOPDs.

2

The magnitude can be severe at the claim level and modest at the enterprise level

CMS estimates the PFS proxy equals about 31% to 54% of OPPS by affected APC. Total financial exposure is nonetheless the product of the rate change, affected volume, payer mix, department status, local rates, cost structure, and downstream contribution.

3

Beneficiary savings are immediate in the payment model; access effects are contingent

CMS estimates $70 million in CY 2027 beneficiary coinsurance savings. Whether patients also experience shorter travel, longer travel, faster scheduling, or service loss depends on how hospitals and independent centers respond.

4

Independent imaging facilities gain a relative price position, not a payment increase

They are generally already paid under the PFS technical component and remain exposed to conversion-factor pressure, MPPR rules, workforce scarcity, authorization friction, capital requirements, and payer contracting.

5

Hospital response determines the second-order market

Possible responses include cost redesign, schedule compression, relocation to on-campus departments, joint ventures, sale or closure of off-campus sites, referral redirection, or a shift toward commercially favorable services. Each has different access and competition consequences.

6

The policy should be evaluated as a natural experiment

A credible study must examine site migration, total imaging use, diagnostic completion, wait time, travel burden, emergency utilization, modality-specific safety, equity, and market concentration, not only federal savings.

What the proposal is not

  • Not a finalized 2027 payment rule as of the research date.
  • Not a systemwide reduction for every hospital imaging service.
  • Does not directly align the professional interpretation component across employment models.
  • Does not establish that all patients and all modalities are interchangeable across sites.
  • Does not guarantee that independent centers can absorb displaced volume.
  • Does not by itself resolve commercial price variation or hospital market power.

Decision implication

Hospital systems should model exposure at the HCPCS and department level before changing operations. Enterprise averages conceal a highly concentrated department-level loss.

Independent centers should treat the proposal as a possible volume opportunity, not a rate windfall.

Policymakers should pair payment reform with prospective monitoring of appointment supply, travel burden, completion, modality-specific safety, and market concentration.

Interpretive discipline

Official savings estimates are presented as CMS estimates. Peer-reviewed policy options are presented with their own service scope and baseline year. Author calculations are labeled illustrative and are not intended to replace a formal CMS or CBO score.

Figure 1 – author framework

The site-neutral shock is a transmission mechanism, not a single rate change

Its ultimate value depends on how providers and patients respond after the payment differential narrows.

Interpretation. Beneficiary savings are immediate in the model. Access and market effects are contingent and must be measured after implementation.
Figure 1, five linked stages: payment, economics, operations, access, market
Figure 1
Shock transmission from payment to market structure

Source: Author framework.

Why the sequence matters

Medicare and beneficiary savings can be estimated from claims, payment rates, and projected volume. Those calculations do not tell us whether appointment capacity will increase or decrease. They do not show whether hospitals will close off-campus imaging centers, shift examinations to the main campus, reduce evening and weekend hours, or redirect patients to independent facilities.

They also do not show whether independent imaging centers have the equipment, staff, and scheduling capacity to accept additional patients. A policy can lower the price of an examination without improving access if the lower-cost facilities are already operating near capacity.

The five connected areas

Transmission questions
AreaQuestion the research asks
PaymentHow much would reimbursement change for the affected imaging services?
EconomicsHow would the reduction affect revenue, contribution margin, and financial break-even volume?
OperationsHow might facilities change staffing, hours, scheduling, equipment investment, and site configuration?
AccessHow could those decisions affect travel distance, appointment wait time, completion, and patient cost?
MarketCould the policy encourage competition and lower prices, or accelerate closures, acquisitions, and consolidation?

Research questions

1

What exactly would the proposed CY 2027 imaging policy change, for which services and sites?

2

How large is the claim-level and facility-level financial exposure for hospital radiology departments?

3

How might independent imaging facilities, radiologists, beneficiaries, and payers respond?

4

Which access, quality, equity, and consolidation risks are theoretically plausible but empirically unresolved?

5

What study design could identify causal post-implementation effects?

Table 1. Evidence hierarchy and use
TierSourcesAnalytic rolePrimary caution
Tier 1Federal Register; CMS rulemaking, fact sheets, payment pagesDefine legal status, services, modifiers, rates, and official impact estimatesProposed provisions may change in the final rule
Tier 2MedPAC; CBO; Johns Hopkins HBHIPolicy design, distributional analysis, and fiscal alternativesOptions differ in scope and cannot be compared as if they were the same policy
Tier 3Peer-reviewed Health Affairs, Health Services Research, Health Affairs ScholarIntegration incentives, policy reach, price variation, beneficiary and hospital distributionMostly observational and often predates the 2027 imaging proposal
Tier 4ACR, AHA, KFF, Yale policy synthesisStakeholder interpretation, implementation context, and competing argumentsAdvocacy claims are labeled and not treated as causal evidence
Tier 5Author scenario modelTranslate payment ratios and cost assumptions into facility exposureIllustrative, not a forecast or formal budget score

Method: critical integrative review rather than meta-analysis. The policy is current and heterogeneous, exposures vary by department status, and the literature offers no common effect measure suitable for statistical pooling.

Figure 2 – policy evolution

Medicare site-neutral policy moved from narrow exceptions to imaging

Select a milestone to see what changed and why it matters to the 2027 proposal.

Figure 2, timeline of Medicare site-neutral policy milestones from 2015 through the proposed 2027 imaging policy
Figure 2. Medicare site-neutral policy timeline, 2015-2027. Sources: CMS (2018, 2025, 2026); MedPAC (2023, 2026). The 2027 imaging policy is proposed.
The distinction that governs everything

The proposal extends site-neutral treatment to grandfathered off-campus imaging. It is not a new reduction for every imaging department in a hospital system. Non-excepted off-campus departments billing modifier PN already receive PFS-equivalent payment, and on-campus HOPDs are outside this specific provision.

Table 3. Operational glossary
TermMeaning in this research
OPPSCMS Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System. HOPPS is used informally, but OPPS is the CMS terminology.
HOPDHospital outpatient department. It may be on campus or off campus.
PBDProvider-based department within a hospital for Medicare payment purposes.
Excepted off-campus PBDA grandfathered or otherwise excepted off-campus department. Generally bills PO and is historically eligible for OPPS treatment.
Non-excepted off-campus PBDA department subject to section 603 site-neutral treatment. Generally bills PN and receives PFS-equivalent payment.
IDTFAn independent diagnostic testing facility, commonly a freestanding imaging center enrolled under Medicare rules.
Technical componentPayment for equipment, technologists, supplies, space, and related operating resources.
Professional componentPayment for the physician’s interpretation. The 2027 proposal principally addresses hospital outpatient facility payment.
03 Policy architecture

A precise map of settings, modifiers, services, and payment components

A hospital system may own multiple sites with different modifiers. Classify each department individually before modelling a dollar.

Setting scope engine

Determines whether a service and facility scenario is affected, exempt, already site neutral, or out of scope.

Included modalities are defined by APC assignment and lack of contrast, not by a generic label such as diagnostic imaging. Contrast composite APCs 8006 and 8008 are not in the listed proposal.

Table 2. Setting-specific policy exposure
Site of careCurrent technical payment logicDirect CY 2027 proposal effectLikely strategic exposure
On-campus HOPDOPPS, subject to normal packaging and adjustmentsNone from this specific imaging proposalPossible inflow from off-campus sites; capacity and scheduling pressure; future policy expansion risk
Excepted off-campus PBD, POGenerally full OPPS for covered imaging before the proposed changeDirect PFS-equivalent payment for affected noncontrast imaging; proposed rural SCH exemptionHigh where PO volume and Medicare share are material
Non-excepted off-campus PBD, PNPFS-equivalent relativity adjuster already appliesLittle direct incremental effectCompetitive baseline and possible destination for standardized operating models
Independent office or IDTFPFS technical component, subject to PFS rulesNo direct rate increasePotential volume gain; constrained by capacity, contracts, capital, staffing, and 2027 PFS pressure
Radiologist professional componentPFS professional component or contractual compensationNot the principal target of the proposalReading volume, worksite, employment, coverage, and contracting may shift

Source: CMS CY 2027 OPPS proposed rule; author policy mapping. The proposal operates as a non-budget-neutral volume-control method under section 1833(t)(2)(F).

Policy boundaries

  • Included modalities are defined by APC assignment and lack of contrast, not by a generic label.
  • Contrast-enhanced CT and MRI composite APCs 8006 and 8008 are not included.
  • Interventional radiology, nuclear medicine, emergency imaging, inpatient imaging, and professional interpretation require separate analysis.
  • Local payment amounts still depend on payment files, wage adjustment, packaging, multiple-procedure rules, and claim configuration.
  • A system may own multiple sites with different modifiers; enterprise averages can conceal a concentrated department-level loss.

Limitations of this classification

This research does not reproduce CMS claims analysis, estimate local wage-adjusted rates, or model every payer contract. The proposed rule’s final language and payment addenda may change.

Facility-level effects require actual PO and PN claim flags, code-level volume, payer mix, local PFS and OPPS amounts, packaged-service logic, and cost-accounting data. Patient access and quality effects remain uncertain because narrow historical policies had limited reach and because site choice is endogenous.

04 Evidence and economic mechanism

Payment differentials influence site selection, but causality requires careful interpretation

CMS reports that 70 high-volume HCPCS codes account for more than 95% of imaging-without-contrast volume at excepted off-campus PBDs.

Figure 3. Growth signals in the CMS top-70 noncontrast imaging cohort

Source: CMS CY 2027 OPPS proposed rule. Changes cover 2016 through 2025. Values as published.

Figure 3, horizontal bars showing utilization per beneficiary up 67 percent, excepted PBD volume up 38 percent, spending up 33 percent, and FFS enrollment down 17 percent
Figure 3. Source: CMS CY 2027 OPPS proposed rule, analysis of claims for the 70 HCPCS codes representing more than 95% of affected off-campus imaging volume.
How CMS reads this. Volume for these codes increased by more than 38%, spending increased 33%, and utilization per FFS beneficiary increased by more than 67%, while FFS enrollment declined approximately 17%. CMS interprets the divergence as evidence that the OPPS differential contributed to migration and unnecessary volume.
Figure 4. Selected 2025 payment examples

Source: CMS CY 2027 OPPS proposed rule, approximate national payments. Local adjustments excluded. Ratios calculated from the published office and OPPS examples.

Figure 4, grouped bars comparing physician office and OPPS payment for DXA and complete breast ultrasound
Figure 4. The same billed service can carry a materially different technical payment.

The economic mechanism has three steps

1

A higher facility payment increases the hospital site’s contribution margin.

2

Acquisition or provider-based conversion can make the higher payment available without changing the underlying clinical service.

3

Referral ownership, scheduling systems, patient navigation, and benefit design can shift volume to higher-paying settings.

Post et al. (2021) estimated that integrated Medicare physicians would have generated approximately $114,000 more reimbursement per physician per year under site-based payment, consistent with a meaningful integration incentive.

Why narrow reforms may appear ineffective

Post et al. (2025) found that only 1.5% of outpatient department spending during 2017 through 2020 occurred at facilities subject to the narrow site-neutral policy, and the policy had little effect on total outpatient spending or hospital-physician integration.

That is not evidence that payment differentials never matter. It shows that policy reach determines observable system effects. Lou et al. (2025) reached the same design lesson from a different direction: standardized annual Medicare savings ranged from $212 million to $7.36 billion across proposals with different APCs and campus scopes.

Quality and complexity evidence

CMS and MedPAC reason that the affected low- to moderate-complexity services can usually be performed safely in physician offices because a large share is already delivered there. A Yale literature review found no peer-reviewed evidence demonstrating a quality difference for the reviewed site-neutral services.

That absence should not be overstated. It is not proof that every patient is interchangeable across sites, and it does not resolve the value of emergency standby, subspecialty support, sedation capability, rapid escalation, or care coordination for medically complex patients.

Evidence boundary

The strongest evidence supports payment comparability for defined, office-common services. It does not support a blanket conclusion that every radiology service, patient, or clinical circumstance should receive the same facility payment.

Policy scope drives fiscal magnitude

Policy scope, not the phrase site neutral, determines fiscal magnitude

Dollar estimates should not be ranked without harmonizing service scope, campus scope, baseline year, behavioural assumptions, budget horizon, and treatment of beneficiary liability.

Figure 5. Fiscal magnitude varies with policy scope

Source: Lou et al. (2025), Health Affairs. Standardized 2021 claims methodology; estimates are not a formal CBO score.

Figure 5, horizontal bar chart comparing annual Medicare savings across three site-neutral policy options
Figure 5. Estimated one-year Medicare savings across three policy definitions.
$0.212BH.R. 5378

4 APCs, off-campus only.

$0.516BARC option

12 APCs, off-campus only.

Figure 6. Site of service in the broad MedPAC option cohort

Source: Lou et al. (2025), analysis of a 20% Medicare fee-for-service claims sample.

Figure 6, horizontal bars showing 181.2 million physician-office claims, 89.1 million hospital outpatient claims, and 4.7 million ambulatory surgery center claims
Figure 6. Most services in the broad MedPAC cohort were already delivered in offices.
Why this matters to the comparability argument. Roughly two thirds of claims in the broad cohort were already furnished in physician offices. That is the empirical basis for the office-common reasoning. It is a statement about where services are delivered, not a demonstration that every patient in the hospital cohort could safely move.
Table 6. Policy scenarios are not interchangeable
ScenarioScopeTime frameCorrect use
CMS CY 2027 proposalAffected noncontrast imaging at excepted off-campus PO departmentsFirst year and later baseline effectsCurrent policy-risk planning; still proposed
CBO off-campus imaging optionImaging services at all off-campus HOPDs2025-2034Congressional policy alternative, not a forecast
CBO broad optionOffice-common services at on- and off-campus HOPDs2025-2034Upper-scope federal budget option
Lou et al. standardized optionsThree APC and campus definitionsOne-year 2021 basisDemonstrate how scope changes fiscal and distributional effects

The principal strategic signal is the order-of-magnitude sensitivity to scope.

05 Financial shock model

The official first-year estimate

These are national estimates, not facility forecasts.

Figure 7. CMS estimate of CY 2027 savings distribution

Source: CMS CY 2027 OPPS proposed rule. Conditional on finalization and implementation.

Figure 7, stacked bar showing 190 million dollars in Medicare savings and 70 million dollars in beneficiary coinsurance savings
Figure 7. CMS projects savings for both Medicare and beneficiaries.
$70MBeneficiary coinsurance

The clearest direct beneficiary effect if the proposal is finalized.

2028MA benchmark flow

CMS states savings would begin flowing into Medicare Advantage benchmarks in 2028, increasing later-year fiscal effects.

Balanced inference

A lower administered price creates certain arithmetic savings on affected claims. It does not, by itself, establish the direction or magnitude of access, quality, or consolidation effects. Those effects must be observed.

Financial shock model

From claim-level rate reduction to enterprise-level exposure

Model exposure at the HCPCS and department level. Enterprise averages conceal a highly concentrated department-level loss.

Facility exposure calculator

Reproduces the paper’s illustrative facility scenario and recalculates on any local inputs.

Medicare claims for affected noncontrast imaging at this department.

Average current allowed amount per claim, in dollars.

CMS range 31% to 54%. 40% is the historical relativity benchmark.

Direct labor, supplies, and other cost that varies with the completed exam.

Enterprise denominator for the exposure ratio.

Simplified liability share. Actual liability depends on claims and supplemental coverage.

Direct revenue loss
$1.22M

Current affected revenue
Modeled new payment
Enterprise exposure
Coinsurance savings
Rate-only volume multiple
Current contribution margin
Cost-adjusted break-even volume
Break-even multiple
Reference case active. These inputs are the paper’s illustrative scenario in Table 5, and the outputs above reproduce it exactly: $2,040,000 current revenue, $68 modeled payment, $1,224,000 direct loss, 1.02% enterprise exposure, $244,800 coinsurance savings, 2.50x rate-only multiple, $1,464,000 current contribution margin, and 73,200 claims or 6.10x cost-adjusted break-even.
Table 4. Financial model equations
MeasureFormulaInterpretation
Direct revenue lossSum over services: volume x (current OPPS payment – site-neutral payment)Gross technical revenue reduction before cost response or volume migration
Enterprise exposure ratioDirect revenue loss / total net patient revenueScale of direct loss relative to the broader organization
Patient coinsurance savingsSum over services: volume x coinsurance rate x payment differenceSimplified patient liability reduction; actual liability depends on claims and supplemental coverage
Rate-only replacement volumeCurrent payment / new paymentVolume multiple needed to replace gross revenue if cost and mix are ignored
Cost-adjusted break-even volumeCurrent volume x (current payment – variable cost) / (new payment – variable cost)Volume needed to preserve contribution margin; undefined or infeasible if new payment is at or below variable cost
Table 5. Illustrative facility scenario
MeasureCalculationIllustrative result
Current affected revenue12,000 x $170$2,040,000
Modeled new payment$170 x 40%$68 per claim
Direct revenue loss12,000 x ($170 – $68)$1,224,000
Enterprise revenue exposure$1,224,000 / $120,000,0001.02%
Simplified coinsurance savings$1,224,000 x 20%$244,800
Rate-only replacement volume$170 / $682.50x
Current contribution margin12,000 x ($170 – $48)$1,464,000
Cost-adjusted break-even volume12,000 x $122 / $2073,200 claims, or 6.10x

Source: Author scenario model. Values are deliberately illustrative and assume total enterprise net patient revenue of $120 million.

Economic threshold

When the modeled site-neutral payment is less than or equal to variable cost, additional volume cannot restore contribution margin. The response must change cost, service configuration, site, payer mix, or strategic purpose.

Formula warning

Payment packaging, claim edits, multiple-procedure rules, wage adjustment, outliers, beneficiary coverage, and downstream services can invalidate simple code-level multiplication. A production model must document what is included and excluded.

The volume fallacy

Volume alone is an implausible answer to a large rate reduction

If the new payment equals 40% of the former OPPS payment, volume must increase 2.5-fold merely to replace gross revenue.

Figure 8. Rate-only gross-revenue replacement volume

Source: Author calculation using the CMS 31% to 54% PFS-to-OPPS range. The 40% point is the historical PFS relativity benchmark. The gold marker tracks the ratio set in the exposure calculator on tab 08.

Figure 8, curve showing required volume from 1.85 times to 3.23 times as site-neutral payment ranges from 54 percent to 31 percent of OPPS
Figure 8. Volume alone is an implausible answer to a large rate reduction.
1.85xAt 54% of OPPS

The most favourable end of the CMS APC range.

2.50xAt 40% of OPPS

The historical relativity-adjuster benchmark.

3.23xAt 31% of OPPS

The least favourable end of the CMS APC range.

Why the rate-only multiple is optimistic

The rate-only calculation replaces gross revenue and ignores cost entirely. Additional volume consumes technologist time, scanner capacity, supplies, billing resources, and maintenance.

The cost-adjusted break-even multiple can be far larger. In the paper’s reference case, a 2.50x rate-only multiple becomes a 6.10x requirement once variable cost is included, and it becomes undefined altogether when the modeled payment falls to or below variable cost.

Capacity is the second constraint

Even where the arithmetic is survivable, the required volume must physically fit. Scanner hours, staffed hours, protocol time, and no-show rates set a hard ceiling that a spreadsheet does not.

Scanners and technologists are lumpy resources. Peak-time capacity may be scarce even when average utilization appears low, so an average-utilization figure is not evidence that displaced volume can be absorbed.

Sensitivity: payer mix times rate reduction

Facility exposure is the product of payer mix and rate reduction

A large claim-level reduction does not translate mechanically into the same enterprise reduction. This interaction should be the first screen in a system’s site inventory.

Live exposure sensitivity matrix

Set your affected share and payment reduction. The matched cell is outlined in the grid below.

The CMS APC range of 31% to 54% of OPPS implies a 46% to 69% reduction.

Author scenario model. Each cell is the affected revenue share multiplied by the payment reduction. Not a forecast: it assumes constant volume, unchanged revenue elsewhere, and excludes behavioural response, cost changes, commercial contracting, and case-mix shifts.

Figure 9, heatmap of total facility revenue reduction across affected revenue shares from 5 to 50 percent and payment reductions from 46 to 69 percent
Figure 9. Facility exposure sensitivity matrix. Source: Author scenario model. Not a forecast; assumes constant volume and all other revenue.

The two worked examples in the paper

If affected Medicare imaging accounts for 10% of total facility revenue, a 60% payment reduction produces an illustrative 6% total-revenue effect before behaviour.

If the affected share is 40%, the same rate reduction produces 24%. Both cells appear in the grid above and can be checked directly.

What the matrix cannot tell you

The matrix is a screen, not a decision. A modest total-revenue effect can still sit on top of a department whose closure would create a critical access gap, and a large effect can sit at a site with three capable alternatives within ten minutes.

Calculate financial exposure and access tier separately. Tab 13 scores the access side.

Beyond the current proposal

The policy debate extends far beyond the proposed 2027 imaging rule

The CBO policy menu demonstrates the importance of separating current rulemaking from broader federal options.

Figure 10. CBO site-neutral policy alternatives

Source: Congressional Budget Office (2024). Ten-year federal outlay effects for specified options over 2025 through 2034. These alternatives are not forecasts of the proposed CY 2027 rule.

Figure 10, comparison of CBO targeted and broad hospital outpatient payment options
Figure 10. Targeted options against the broad on- and off-campus option.
$5.6BDrug administration

All off-campus HOPDs, ten-year federal outlay reduction.

$7.6BImaging, off-campus

Applying site-neutral rates to imaging across all off-campus HOPDs, 2025 through 2034.

Do not rank these numbers

Dollar estimates across these sources should not be ranked without harmonizing service scope, campus scope, baseline year, behavioural assumptions, budget horizon, and treatment of beneficiary liability. The principal strategic signal is the order-of-magnitude sensitivity to scope.

06 Stakeholder consequences

The same policy produces different incentives across radiology organizations

For an exposed PO-billing department the direct risk is a technical-component margin shock. What follows depends on what the site supports.

Hospital radiology departments

Enterprise implications depend on whether the site supports profitable downstream care, community access, physician alignment, screening programs, or strategic geographic presence. Hospital accounting can understate or overstate the true loss if it allocates system overhead mechanically or ignores downstream contribution.

Table 7. Hospital response pathways
Hospital responseFinancial logicOperational consequenceAccess and market risk
Retain and redesignLower cost per slot and preserve strategic volumeProtocol standardization, schedule density, extended hours, centralized authorizationMay preserve local access; workforce intensity may rise
Shift to on-campus HOPDRetain OPPS payment under the specific proposalCapacity expansion, referral routing, patient travel changeLonger travel or congestion; creates a visible substitution response
Convert or restructure siteAlign operating model with PFS-equivalent economicsEnrollment, contracting, governance, and billing changesCould improve price clarity; transition disruption possible
Joint venture or saleShare capital and payer leverage; monetize assetNew ownership and referral arrangementsMay support survival or increase concentration
Close affected serviceStop negative contributionRedeploy staff and equipment; transfer patientsPotential local capacity loss, especially where alternatives are thin
Cross-subsidizePreserve mission despite negative marginRequires explicit board-approved subsidy and performance guardrailsSupports access but may be unsustainable without a transparent policy

Independent imaging centers and IDTFs

Independent centers are relative beneficiaries because the hospital differential narrows. They do not receive an automatic rate increase. The proposed CY 2027 PFS conversion factors were also lower than 2026 because a one-year statutory increase expires, underscoring that PFS economics remain pressured.

  • Opportunity. Acquire displaced referral volume and compete on patient cost and appointment speed.
  • Constraint. Scanners and technologists are lumpy resources; peak-time capacity may be scarce even when average utilization appears low.
  • Constraint. Payer network inclusion and authorization rules can prevent patients from following a low-price referral path.
  • Constraint. Independent facilities may lack sedation, emergency escalation, implanted-device protocols, or subspecialty support for selected patients.
  • Strategic response. Document quality, turnaround, access, and patient experience rather than competing only on nominal price.

Radiologists and radiology groups

The professional component is not the principal target, but professional practice is exposed through volume location, coverage obligations, call structure, reading contracts, employment, and productivity expectations.

A department that compresses hours may create work spikes. A system that moves cases on campus may increase logistics and subspecialty coordination. A freestanding center that grows volume may need new professional coverage and faster turnaround.

Contract language should distinguish technical payment shocks from professional compensation methodology.

A mature couple reviews imaging-site options on a phone between a hospital outpatient pavilion and an independent diagnostic center
Beneficiaries
Site-neutral payment changes the price signal

Patients still experience a full pathway of referral, authorization, scheduling, travel, examination, interpretation, and follow-up.

Beneficiaries

The clearest direct beneficiary effect is lower coinsurance on affected services if the proposal is finalized. CMS reports that average cost sharing at excepted off-campus PBDs is more than double the physician-office amount for the analyzed cohort.

Yet net patient value includes more than liability: travel, parking, schedule availability, care coordination, digital access, language support, diagnostic completion, and the probability of being redirected after an inappropriate site selection.

Payers and employers

Medicare gains immediate program savings. Commercial payers may use the federal policy as a negotiating reference, but commercial contracting is not mechanically tied to Medicare.

Philips and Whaley (2025) found HOPD imaging prices roughly two to three times office prices in a large Blue Cross Blue Shield dataset, with substantial facility-price variation. Employers and plans therefore have incentives to combine price steering with quality standards and network adequacy, while monitoring whether savings are offset by hospital commercial price increases elsewhere.

07 Access, quality, equity, and market structure

Rates are observable immediately; patient-pathway consequences emerge through behaviour

A high revenue loss does not justify a response that creates critical access risk, and a low revenue loss does not eliminate the need to monitor vulnerable populations.

Local access-risk classifier

Seven local conditions, scored independently of the financial model. Any condition at the lowest level caps the tier.

1. Clinically capable alternative sites within a reasonable travel radius
2. Staffed capacity at those alternatives at the hours patients actually use
3. Change in average patient travel if this site reduces hours or closes
4. Network participation and prior-authorization friction at the alternatives
5. Share of patients needing sedation, device protocols, mobility or escalation support
6. Staffing stability in technologists and radiologists at the alternatives
7. Public transit and transportation availability for the affected population
of 14
Table 9. Local access-risk classification
TierLocal conditionsOperating implication
LowAt least two clinically capable alternatives, ample staffed capacity, modest travel change, broad network participationStandard transition monitoring
ModerateAlternative capacity exists but peak waits, authorization, transportation, or specialty capability are constrainedCapacity commitment and targeted patient navigation
HighOne realistic alternative, material travel increase, fragile staffing, or high share of mobility and complexity needsFormal mitigation plan before site or hour reduction
CriticalNo timely clinically capable alternative, or closure would create a diagnostic-access gapPreserve capacity, seek exception or subsidy, and trigger policy review
Table 8. Access mechanisms and measurable endpoints
MechanismPotential benefitPotential harmMeasure
Lower beneficiary cost sharingHigher affordability and completionSmall effect for patients with supplemental coverage; confusion may persistAllowed amount, patient liability, abandonment
Volume migration to independent sitesLower prices and potentially faster appointmentsCapacity shortage, network exclusion, fragmented follow-upNew-patient wait, slot utilization, denial rate, result integration
Migration to on-campus HOPDPreserves hospital capabilityLonger travel, parking burden, congestion, continued higher costTravel time, missed appointments, on-campus share
Off-campus closure or hour reductionEliminates unsustainable capacityLocal service loss and delayed diagnosisSite count, weekly hours, county-level capacity
Protocol and schedule redesignLower cost per scan and improved throughputShorter slots or workforce strain could affect experienceRepeat imaging, safety events, overtime, turnover

Rural and safety-net nuance

The proposed rural SCH exemption reduces direct exposure for one vulnerable group. Many critical access hospitals are outside OPPS, so the policy does not map uniformly onto the word rural.

Rural hospitals that are neither CAHs nor exempt SCHs, urban safety-net systems with geographically dispersed outpatient sites, and communities with few independent alternatives still require local assessment. The relevant unit is not hospital type; it is the affected department’s claims status plus substitute capacity within a realistic travel radius.

Quality safeguards

Low-complexity noncontrast imaging can be office-common while selected patients require a hospital environment because of mobility, oxygen dependence, anesthesia, device management, behavioural support, isolation, rapid escalation, or coordinated same-day specialty care.

  • Separate routine outpatient imaging from emergency, inpatient, sedated, contrast-enhanced, interventional, and high-risk pathways.
  • Track repeat imaging and failed examinations as potential signals of inappropriate site selection.
  • Measure time from order to completed study, and time from abnormal result to documented follow-up.
  • Stratify access by dual eligibility, disability, age, language, rurality, and neighbourhood deprivation.
  • Treat patient travel time and transportation availability as quality-of-access outcomes, not background variables.

Market structure

Site-based payment can contribute to hospital-physician integration by increasing reimbursement after acquisition. Site-neutral payment can weaken that incentive, but it does not automatically reverse consolidation.

Hospitals may respond through on-campus relocation, joint ventures, acquisition of independent centers, or commercial price negotiation. Independent centers may also consolidate to gain capital and payer leverage. Market concentration should therefore be a prespecified outcome rather than an assumed benefit.

08 Strategic response

A staged agenda for hospital and independent radiology leaders

Establish factual exposure before testing operating options, and set access guardrails before cost targets.

Phase 1: establish factual exposure

1

Inventory every imaging site by campus status, provider-based status, PO and PN modifier use, rural SCH status, enrollment type, and ownership.

2

Extract twelve to twenty-four months of affected HCPCS volume and allowed amounts, separating technical and professional components.

3

Crosswalk each claim to the proposed APC scope and to local 2027 OPPS and PFS-equivalent amounts when payment files become available.

4

Reconcile finance, revenue-cycle, radiology, and compliance views. Do not rely on a facility label from a scheduling system.

5

Calculate direct gross loss, total-revenue exposure, contribution margin, downstream value, and beneficiary liability change by site and modality.

Table 10. Phase 2 strategic workstreams
WorkstreamQuestionRequired evidenceDecision output
CapacityCan current sites absorb likely referral migration?Scanner-hour utilization, slot curves, no-shows, staffing, downtimeModality and hour-specific capacity plan
CostWhat cost per completed exam is controllable?Direct labor, service contracts, supplies, occupancy, denial reworkTarget cost and redesign roadmap
AccessWhich communities depend on the affected site?Patient origin, travel time, alternative sites, public transit, wait timeAccess-risk map and mitigation
ClinicalWhich patients require hospital resources?Protocol, sedation, device, mobility, escalation, same-day care needsSite-selection criteria
ContractingCan payer and professional agreements adapt?Network rates, authorization rules, read coverage, downstream contractsNegotiation and amendment list
CapitalShould the system retain, convert, partner, relocate, or exit?NPV scenarios, demand forecast, strategic value, regulatory requirementsBoard-level site strategy

Phase 3: execute with guardrails

  • Use a proposal-status banner in every model and executive dashboard until a final rule is issued.
  • Freeze irreversible site decisions until exposure is validated against claim-level modifiers and final payment files.
  • Set access guardrails before cost targets: maximum wait, travel, cancellation, and incomplete-study rates.
  • Create a referral-routing standard incorporating clinical appropriateness, patient preference, network status, and total out-of-pocket cost.
  • Monitor on-campus substitution to avoid solving department economics by increasing patient burden or masking policy intent.
  • Publish a monthly transition scorecard for the first twelve months after implementation.

Escalation triggers

  • A final-rule scope or payment ratio that differs materially from the modeled reference case.
  • A projected negative contribution margin after feasible cost redesign.
  • Insufficient substitute scanner capacity within a clinically reasonable travel radius.
  • A sustained increase in wait time, cancellation, failed examination, or technologist overtime.
  • A proposed site closure, ownership transaction, or on-campus migration with material community impact.
Governance threshold

Any escalation trigger should pause irreversible action until finance, radiology operations, compliance, medical leadership, and patient-access owners validate the response together.

Recommended board dashboard

Transition scorecard

Publish monthly for the first twelve months after implementation. Each domain carries its own guardrail and cadence.

Finance

Direct revenue at risk and contribution-margin variance

Guardrail: no unexplained variance above 5% of modeled loss

Monthly
Operations

Completed exams per staffed scanner hour

Guardrail: no increase in repeat or failed examinations

Weekly
Access

Order-to-completion days and travel time

Guardrail: no material deterioration for high-risk communities

Monthly
Patient

Estimated liability and cancellation rate

Guardrail: savings not offset by higher abandonment

Monthly
Workforce

Vacancy, overtime, turnover, workload

Guardrail: no unsafe staffing or sustained overtime spike

Monthly
Market

Share by site type and local alternative capacity

Guardrail: review closures, acquisitions, or concentration increases

Quarterly

Interactive model design specification

The paper specifies a WordPress decision model that preserves evidence provenance and policy status. Each output must carry a source label, input date, scenario status, and plain-language explanation. The tables below are the published specification.

Table 15. Interactive model outputs
OutputDisplayDecision use
Policy statusPersistent proposed or final banner with effective date and sourcePrevents premature operational action
Revenue at riskDollar, percent of affected revenue, percent of total revenuePrioritize sites and validate materiality
Contribution impactBefore and after margin, and break-even volumeSeparate gross revenue from economic sustainability
Patient savingsEstimated liability reduction with assumptionsCommunicate the affordability impact
Capacity responseScanner hours and staffing needed for the migrated volumeTest whether alternatives can absorb demand
Access riskTravel, wait, substitute capacity, and clinical capability flagsPrevent savings from obscuring local harm
Scenario comparisonLow, reference, and high waterfall and heatmapSupport board decisions under uncertainty
ExportPDF or CSV summary with timestamp, source versions, and assumptionsCreate an auditable decision record
Build rule

The model should answer two questions separately: how much payment is at risk, and what patient and operational conditions make a response acceptable. Combining them into a single score would obscure the central policy trade-off. That is why the exposure calculator on tab 08 and the access classifier on tab 13 are scored independently.

Table B1. Local scenario input worksheet
InputLow caseReference caseHigh caseLocal source
Affected annual claimsClaims extract
Current average technical paymentAllowed amount
Site-neutral payment ratio54%40%31%CMS range or local file
Variable cost per claimCost accounting
Avoidable annual fixed costFinance
Total net patient revenueGeneral ledger
Estimated volume migrationReferral and capacity analysis
Available scanner hoursScheduling
Average patient travel changeGeospatial analysis
Transition costImplementation plan

Note the direction of the cases: the low case uses the most favourable payment ratio, 54% of OPPS. The high case uses 31%, the least favourable end of the CMS range.

09 Post-implementation research agenda

A causal evaluation must measure more than savings

If finalized, the policy will reduce allowed amounts and beneficiary liability for affected PO-billed noncontrast imaging. Everything else is uncertain.

Preferred design

Use a national difference-in-differences event study with the affected PO-billed APCs as the primary treatment cohort. Candidate comparators include the same APCs at non-excepted PN-billing departments and offices, unaffected contrast composite APCs, and on-campus departments, with careful testing of parallel pretrends and contamination.

A triple-difference specification can interact affected service, excepted off-campus status, and post-period. Department and time fixed effects, market trends, and patient risk adjustment should be prespecified. Power calculations should be based on clustered treatment assignment and the number of exposed departments, rather than on claims alone.

Table 12. Post-implementation outcomes and data
DomainPrimary outcomeSecondary outcomeData source
PaymentAllowed amount per standardized episodeBeneficiary liability; supplemental coverage100% Medicare FFS claims
UtilizationStudies per 1,000 beneficiariesRepeat imaging; modality mixCarrier and outpatient claims
Site migrationShare by PO, PN, office or IDTF, and on-campusProvider entry, exit, and conversionClaims, PECOS, Provider of Services
AccessOrder-to-completion proxy or appointment waitTravel time, no-show, cancellationClaims plus EHR or scheduling sample
QualityRepeat within 30 days of a failed examinationED use, hospitalization, time to follow-upClaims and selected clinical registries
EquityDifferential effects by dual status and ruralityDisability, deprivation, languageClaims, Census, Area Deprivation Index
MarketImaging HHI and ownership concentrationAcquisition, joint venture, site closureClaims, PECOS, M&A, price transparency data
WorkforceTechnologist and radiologist workloadVacancy, overtime, turnoverHospital and center operational cohort

Identification safeguards

  • Plot at least twelve quarters of pre-period coefficients and report joint pretrend tests.
  • Use service-level and facility-level exposure intensity rather than a single treated indicator when feasible.
  • Account for contemporaneous OPPS, PFS, 340B, prior-authorization, and Medicare Advantage policy changes.
  • Test for anticipatory behaviour after the proposed and final rules but before implementation.
  • Measure spillover to on-campus HOPDs and independent centers; a stable treated-site count can conceal substantial migration.
  • Use falsification services not affected by the APC policy and negative-control time periods.
  • Report heterogeneous effects by baseline capacity, rurality, market concentration, ownership, modality, and patient complexity.
  • Separate statistical significance from operational importance, particularly for travel, wait, and diagnostic completion.

Minimum publishable analysis package

A doctoral-quality evaluation should include a preregistered protocol, code lists with version dates, a reproducible rate crosswalk, a cohort flow diagram, balance and pretrend tables, event-study figures, robustness to alternative comparators, missing-data analysis, heterogeneity estimates, and a transparent discussion of generalizability.

The policy-status timeline should be treated as an exposure feature rather than a background narrative. Confidence intervals should be reported in natural units such as dollars, days, miles, and completed studies per 1,000 beneficiaries.

Table 13. Recommended causal estimands
EstimandDefinitionInterpretation
Intent-to-treatChange among claims at departments exposed by policy status, regardless of subsequent site responseCaptures the effect of the policy assignment and resulting behaviour
Exposure-weighted effectEffect scaled by baseline affected revenue or claim shareEstimates dose response and improves relevance for heterogeneous systems
Patient-pathway effectChange attributed to the patient’s originating market or order, independent of the final siteDetects migration that site-based analysis can miss
Distributional effectDifference in effects across patient and market strataTests whether savings or access changes are equitably distributed

Five policy principles

1

Specify scope at the service, setting, and payment-component level. Ambiguity creates faulty forecasts and unsafe operational responses.

2

Use empirically defensible clinical comparability criteria and a workable exception pathway for patients who require hospital resources.

3

Return at least part of the savings to beneficiaries through lower liability and clear site-of-care information.

4

Monitor access and market structure prospectively, with triggers for corrective action when closures, travel, wait, or concentration worsen.

5

Publish reproducible payment files, code lists, impact methods, and post-implementation findings so the policy can be revised on evidence.

Conclusion

Site neutrality should be judged by total patient value: clinically appropriate access, diagnostic quality, affordability, operational resilience, and competitive capacity, not by a rate ratio alone. For radiology leaders the immediate task is disciplined exposure modelling. For researchers the task is causal evaluation. For policymakers the task is to preserve access while removing payment differentials that are not supported by clinical or resource differences.

References

Sources current through July 31, 2026.

1. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2026). Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems; CY 2027 proposed rule. Federal Register, 91 FR 41734.
2. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2026). Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System.
3. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2025). Calendar Year 2026 Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and Ambulatory Surgical Center final rule fact sheet.
4. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2026). Calendar Year 2027 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule fact sheet.
5. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. (2026). Hospital inpatient and outpatient services. In March 2026 Report to Congress: Medicare Payment Policy.
6. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. (2023). Aligning fee-for-service payment rates across ambulatory settings. In June 2023 Report to Congress.
7. Congressional Budget Office. (2024). Reduce payments for hospital outpatient departments.
8. Lou, K. K., Linehan, K. E., da Fonte, L. N., Lai, P., & Buntin, M. B. (2025). Medicare site-neutral payment policies: Effects of proposals on hospitals and beneficiary groups. Health Affairs, 44(6), 668-676. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2024.01501
9. Post, B., et al. (2025). Site-neutral payment reform: Little impact on outpatient Medicare spending or hospital-physician integration. Health Affairs, 44(6), 659-667. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2024.00972
10. Post, B., Buchmueller, T., & Ryan, A. M. (2021). Vertical integration of hospitals and physicians: Economic theory and empirical evidence on spending and quality. Health Services Research.
11. Philips, Z., & Whaley, C. M. (2025). Commercial price variation for common imaging studies. Health Affairs Scholar, 3(5), qxaf092. doi:10.1093/haschl/qxaf092
12. Cooper, Z., et al. (2023). Site-neutral payments: A literature review. Yale Tobin Center for Economic Policy.
13. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Hopkins Business of Health Initiative. (2025). Site-neutral payment for ambulatory care: A Medicare policy framework.
14. American College of Radiology. (2026). The HOPPS proposed rule would grow site-neutral imaging payments.
15. KFF. (2026). The Trump administration continues to advance incremental site-neutral payment reforms.
16. American Hospital Association. (2023). Fact sheet: Medicare hospital outpatient site-neutral payment policies.
17. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Hospital price transparency.

Research integrity statement

This research is an independent evidence synthesis and scenario analysis. It received no external funding, uses no patient-level data, and does not constitute legal, reimbursement, accounting, or investment advice. No institutional review board review was required. Policy status and cited sources were checked through July 31, 2026.

The Radiology Site-Neutral Shock. Medicare’s proposed 2027 payment realignment and the strategic future of radiology.

Prepared by Kelly Emrick, DHSc, PhD, MBA, BSRT(ARRT)R. Critical integrative evidence synthesis and scenario analysis, 2026.

All calculators are illustrative decision aids, not forecasts or budget scores. The CY 2027 OPPS imaging provision is a proposed rule and may change before implementation.